Ottawa Citizen - July 14, 2011
By Colin Kenny
In the National Post last week, I argued that our military mission to Afghanistan was pretty much a failure. There were some successes – we pleased our American allies and we gave our troops combat experience. But there were plenty of negatives on the other side of the balance sheet.
For a start, if one of the main reasons for the mission was to root out al-Qaida, they were long gone by the time our troops got to Kandahar, scattered to less vulnerable international hiding places.
There are a number of facts that Canadians should consider when reflecting on the mission: we exit with the Taliban stronger than it was when we came; we exit with a corrupt government in place as the only alternative to the Taliban; we exit with the Afghan army and police ineffectual protectors of democracy; we exit with only traces of successful foreign aid expenditures (despite all the money spent); we exit with the drug trade in full and unmolested swing; we exit with the Taliban unwilling to sign on to a peace deal because they know the westerners will soon be gone, so why deal?
For what Canada gained – and I acknowledge that pleasing the Americans and giving our troops combat experience are worthy achievements – we lost 157 heroic soldiers, sent many more home physically and/or psychologically wounded, and spent billions of dollars that could have done a lot of good in other poor countries – or, for that matter, at home.
I applaud the fact that, for those who survived this ordeal, morale is up in the Canadian Forces. That shouldn’t come as a surprise – soldiers like to test their mettle, and our soldiers’ courageous performance in Afghanistan – despite not always having sufficient number of personnel or the right equipment – won the admiration of military people around the world, not to mention the Canadian public. So, bravo. But at what price?
I got many thoughtful replies to my article in the Post, some from military people, and others commending me for confronting the truth. I also got a lot of messages full of four-letter words (which you would think would be easier to spell). One e-mail said my *#@&% opinions provided a perfect rationale for abolition of the Senate.
Funny, I always thought one of the primary roles of the Senate was to hold the government of the day to account, and that’s exactly what I was trying to do with two governments – one led by Paul Martin and the other by Stephen Harper. Neither has ever levelled with the Canadian public on what they intended to achieve in Afghanistan, and how they would measure success.
Mr. Harper has demonstrated clearly how the politically cunning measure success: skip the unpleasant details and just offer up a hearty “mission accomplished.”
Well, various research agencies have provided those who are interested with some unpleasant numbers that the cheerleaders for this war like to skip over.
According to the Human Rights Unit of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2,080 Afghan civilians were killed by anti-government elements in 2010; 3,366 were injured. It has been argued that the loss of so many innocent lives has soured Afghan’s attitude toward NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. Certainly the Taliban’s increasing resistance has been palpable.
According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, travel risk in 2003 was “medium risk” in 90 percent of the country, with 10 percent being “high risk.” By 2010 only half the country was rated “medium risk, with 20 per cent rated “high risk” and 30 percent rated in an even more dangerous category – “extreme risk.”
According to the Afghanistan NGO safety office (ANSO Report Issue 76, June 2011) number of armed opposition group attacks increased from 5,677 in 2008 to 12,929 in 2010.
According to U.S. government’s IED Defeat Organization, the number of Taliban roadside bomb attacks deemed to be “effective” ballooned from 219 in 2005 to 3,084 in 2010.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Taliban had “shadow governors” in place in 11 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces in 2005. By 2009 there were 33 shadow governors in place, each responsible for directing the insurgency against government and coalition troops.
And so it goes. Meanwhile, the UN says 2,579 NATO troops have died in Afghanistan since 2001. UN figures show that 8,832 Afghans civilians have been killed as a result of military operations since 2007 (nobody had deemed it essential to count before then).
I don’t think this adds up to success. Then again, if you believe that it is important to look at this war through rose-coloured glasses to make everyone feel better, I guess we should just forget about all these repugnant little numbers. Give me an A. Give me an F. Give me a G . . .
[Colin Kenny is former chair of the Senate Committee on Security and Defence Kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca]